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Taxing Recoveries That Are Not “Personal Physical 
Injuries or Physical Sickness”
-by Neil E. Harl*
  With a pair of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in 2005 on handling litigation costs including 
contingent attorney’s fees1 and an attempt by Congress to resolve the controversy for such fees 
and expenses in 20042 with respect to costs associated with discrimination in employment and 
enforcement of civil rights,3 many thought the taxation of settlements and court judgments 
involving “personal physical injuries or physical sickness” was, at long last, settling down and 
taxpayers and tax practitioners could expect a modicum of certainty for a few years. However, 
the recently decided case of Murphy v. United States4 changed all of that. That decision held 
unconstitutional the provisions of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) excluding from gross income – 
“The amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by 
suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of 
personal physical injuries or physical sickness.”
The statutory history
 The current version of the statute was last amended in 1996 and, until August 20, 1996, the 
effective date of the provision in the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,5 stated –
“The amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as 
lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness.”
 The 1996 enactment made it clear that punitive damages were includible in gross income 
as were damages not attributable to physical injury or physical sickness.6 The cases that 
followed were in agreement that the narrowing of the exclusion provision made recoveries 
relating to breach of contract and defamation charges, for example, taxable7 along with 
punitive damages.8
Murphy v. United States
 The 2006 case of Murphy v. United States9 found the distinction drawn in the 1996 
enactment unconstitutional as a violation of the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The Murphy  case involved an employee of the New York Air National Guard 
who had made complaints about environmental hazards at a New York Air National Guard 
airbase. As a result of the complaints, her employer retaliated and Murphy was “blacklisted” 
and unfavorable references were provided to potential employers. Murphy charged that the 
retaliatory action resulted in emotional distress and injury to her professional reputation from 
her “whistle-blower” activity. She sued and recovered a substantial amount, approximately  
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of her “capital” and, therefore, was not taxable. As the court stated, 
“. . . damages received solely in compensation for a personal injury 
are not income within the meaning of that term in the Sixteenth 
Amendment. First, as compensation for the loss of a personal 
attribute, such as wellbeing or a good reputation, the damages are 
not received in lieu of income. Second, the framers of the Sixteenth 
Amendment would not have understood compensation for a 
personal injury – including a nonphysical injury – to be income.” 
Accordingly, the court held I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) unconstitutional 
insofar as it “. . . permits the taxation of an award of damages for 
mental distress and loss of reputation.”
Impact of the decision
 It is likely that the decision will be appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court. If so, and if the court agrees with the 
appellate decision, or certiorari is denied, the ball will be in the 
Congressional court. The Congress would have little choice but to 
go along with allowing recoveries from non-physical injuries and 
non-physical sickness to be excludible from gross income. If the 
appellate court is reversed by the United States Supreme Court, 
and the distinction in taxation of damages is held constitutional 
and the high court is unimpressed with the argument that such 
damages should not be considered to be income, the state of the 
law would be returned to where it has been since 1996.
Footnotes
 1   Commissioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826 (S. Ct. 2005); 
Commissioner v. Banaitas, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,155 
(S. Ct. 2005).
 2   American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357. 
§ 703(a), adding I.R.C. § 62(a)(20).
 3   See generally 5 Harl, Agricultural Law § 39.06 (2006); Harl, 
Agricultural Law Manual § 4.02[14] (2006).
 4  2006-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,476 (D. D.C. 2006).
 5   Pub. L.  No. 104-188, § 1605(a).
 6   I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
 7   E.g., Polone v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2003-339 (payment 
before the 1996 enactment became effective).
 8   Green v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-250 (punitive damages 
and interest).
 9  2006-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,476 (D. D.C. 2005).
 10  Id.
 11  31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 308 (1918).
 12   T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918).
$70,000, in damages of which $45,000 was for “emotional distress 
or mental anguish” and $25,000 was for “injury to professional 
reputation.”10 
 The District Court held that the damages were not excludible 
under I.R.C. § 104(a)(1) but, on appeal, the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia, reversed, agreeing with Murphy that the 
treatment she had received was unconstitutional.
 The appellate court focused heavily on the notion that payments 
for the restoration of capital are not income, and making a person 
whole is viewed as a restoration of human capital and looked to 
three authorities in support of that point of view – (1) an opinion 
of the United States Attorney General; (2) a statement by the 
Internal Revenue Service and the Department of the Treasury; 
and (3) a passage in a Congressional Committee Report (which 
was viewed as ambiguous and was given less weight). All three 
statements had preceded the enactment of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) and 
all had taken the position that recoveries to restore capital are not 
income. 
	 The	Office	of	the	United	States	Attorney	General,	in	an	opinion	
rendered to the Secretary of the Treasury as to whether the 
proceeds from an accident insurance policy were income under 
the Internal Revenue Code as it stood prior to the  1918 Act, had 
stated – 
“Without	affirming	that	the	human	body	is	in	a	technical	
sense the ‘capital’ invested in an accident policy, in a 
broad, natural sense the proceeds of the policy do not 
substitute, so far as they go, capital which is the source 
of future periodical income. They merely take the place 
of capital in human ability which was destroyed by the 
accident. They are therefore ‘capital’ as distinguished 
from ‘income’ receipts.”11
 The Department of the Treasury had made a similar statement 
in a revenue ruling – 
“upon similar principles. . .  an amount received by an 
individual as the result of a suit or compromise for personal 
injuries sustained. . . through an accident is not income 
[that is] taxable.”12
 The House Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of 
Representatives on the bill that became the Revenue Act of 1918 
had said –
Under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts 
received through accident or health insurance, or under 
workmen’s compensation acts, as compensation for 
personal injury or sickness, and damages received on 
account of such injuries or sickness, are required to be 
included in gross income.
The Court of Appeals concluded that to draw a distinction between 
recoveries that were made “by reason of” or “because of” personal 
physical injury or physical sickness and those failing to meet that 
test was unconstitutional. Essentially, the taxpayer argued that 
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) made her recovery taxable when  the recovery 
should not have been taxable under the Sixteenth Amendment. 
Thus, the court’s holding meant that her recovery for emotional 
distress and injury to her professional reputation was a restoration 
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